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The social discount rate measures the rate at which 
a society would be willing to trade present for future 
consumption. As such it is one of the most critical inputs 
needed for cost-benefit analysis. This paper presents 
estimates of the social discount rates for nine Latin 
American countries. It is argued that if the recent track 
record in terms of growth in the region is indicative of 
future performance, estimates of the social discount 
rate would be in the 3-4 percent range. However, to the 
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effort in the department to to understand the causes, consequences and possible solutions to the challenges created by 
climate change. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at hlopez@worldbank.org.  
extent that the region improves on its past performance, 
the social discount rate to be used in the evaluation of 
projects would increase to the 5-7 percent range. The 
paper also argues that if the social planner gives a similar 
chance to the low and high growth scenario, the discount 
rate should be dependent on the horizon of the project, 
declining from 4.4 percent for a 25-year horizon to less 
than 4 percent for a 100-year horizon. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
The social discount rate measures the rate at which a society is willing to trade present for 
future consumption. As such it is one of the most critical inputs used in cost benefit 
analysis of public projects (and more generally public policies), and it is especially 
relevant when considering projects whose benefits are only apparent over the very long 
run (such as for example interventions to adapt to or mitigate climate change concerns 
which by their own nature have an intergenerational dimension).  
 
For example, with a 2 percent discount rate a project with a cost of $1 today producing 
benefits of $2.7 in 50 years from now would be socially acceptable. However, this would 
not be the case if the discount rate is 5 percent in which case the break-even benefit 
would be almost four times as large ($11.5). More dramatically, these discrepancies 
increase markedly as the time horizon expands. With a 2 percent discount rate the break-
even benefit of a $1 project that has a pay off in 100 years is $7.2 but it increases more 
than twenty-fold (to $131) when the discount rate is 5 percent. As a result, social planners 
using a high discount rate will have a tendency to favor projects with short-run benefits 
over those with payoffs in the long run, whereas those using low discount rates will be 
more amenable to finance the latter type of interventions. 
 
Given the relevance of the discount rate for policy making, it should not be surprising the 
interest that the topic has generated in the economics literature going back to (just to 
name a few) Ramsey (1928), Feldstein (1964), Baumol (1968), or Stern (1977).  More 
recently, the issue has also received renewed attention following The Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change and among others, the reviews of the The Stern Review by 
Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman (2007).  Among some of the recent empirical works, it is 
worth mentioning Eavns and Sezer (2004), Kula (2004), or Evans (2005). 
 
In practice, two types of discount rates have been advocated. One is the use of the social 
opportunity cost (SOC) of the investment (Baumol, 1968, Harberger, 1972), defined as 
the value to society of the next best alternative use of the resources devoted to the project 
in question
1 (i.e. the real rate of return that would be earned on a marginal project in the 
private sector). The motivation for this discount rate is that the decision to invest in a 
public project means that the resources devoted to the project in question will be 
unavailable for private investment. Thus, on efficiency considerations, projects should be 
undertaken when their potential social benefit is larger than the loss resulting from the 
removal of resources from the private sector.  
 
However, a number of authors (among others Sen, 1961 and Feldstein, 1964) have argued 
that an individual’s preferences in collective saving and investment are likely to differ 
from his or her preferences in individual decisions as public investment and consumption 
by future generations can be viewed as public goods. Put in other words, an individual’s 
time preference may depend on whether s/he is acting alone or as part of a group and 
hence if others are willing to save s/he may be willing to do it as well. For these authors a 
more appropriate discount rate is one based on a social time preference (STP) that assigns 
                                                 
1 Note that this will typically be larger than the public sector borrowing rate.  




In practice, it is likely that a single rate -whether an SOC or an STP- is not appropriate in 
all cases and that the analysis of different public interventions requires the use of 
different discount rates. For example, the European Commission (EC) recommends the 
use of an SOC rate in those cases where the financial return of the project is an important 
public concern (e.g. investment by a public enterprise that is expected to operate without 
subsidies). On the other hand, the EC recommends the use of an STP
3 for the more 
standard cost benefit analysis of public projects.
4 Similarly, Spain uses a 6 percent
5 for 
transport projects but a lower STP based 4 percent for water projects. In the U.S., the 
Office of Management and Budget recommends a real rate of between 2.5-3 percent 
(depending on the horizon of the project under consideration) based on the costs of 
borrowing for the government to assess the cost effectiveness of potential interventions 
and a 7 percent for cost benefit analysis (Spackman, 2006).  
 
In this paper we enter this debate and present empirical estimates of the social discount 
rate for nine Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru) that are based on the STP hypothesis. To this end, 
we rely on Ramsey’s formula (Ramsey, 1928), an equation that relates the social discount 
rate to: (i) a pure time preference rate; (ii) the growth rate of per capita 
income/consumption; and (iii) the elasticity of marginal utility of income/consumption. 
Below we present estimates of this last parameter for the countries under analysis that are 
based on the tax regime and the principle of equal absolute sacrifice (Evans, 2004).  
 
To anticipate some of the results of the paper, it is found that if the recent track record in 
terms of growth in the region is an indicative of future performance, our estimates of the 
social discount rate would be around 3.5-4 percent. To the extent that the region improves 
on its past performance, which admittedly has been quite dismal and therefore may bias 
the results, the social discount rate to be used in the evaluation of future projects would 
increase. In this regard, estimates in the 5-6 percent would be more appropriate. These 
STP rates are slightly higher than those estimated for six major developed countries by 
Evans (2004) using the same methodology (4-5 percent). Thus, in principle, it will be 
possible to find projects that are acceptable in the developed countries but are not in Latin 
America. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we review the theoretical 
background underlying the STP. In sections III and IV we discuss the calibration of the 
components of the social discount rate (section III) and of the discount rate itself (section 
IV). Finally, in section V we close with some final reflections.  
                                                 
2 Implicit in this discussion is that the fact that typically country based STP rates are lower than SOC based 
rates. 
3Admittedly, since the European SOC and the EC estimated STP are both close to 5 percent (in real terms), 
the EC suggests the use of this rate for both type of projects. 
4 In turn, other authors have argued that the appropriate discount rate should be a weighted average of the 
SOC and STP rates. 
5 Unless otherwise noted, all rates are in real terms. 
  3 
II. The social discount rate 
 
There are at least two arguments that can be put forward to justify STP discounting. First, 
individuals seem to have a preference for immediate rather than delayed gratification,
6 
and hence to the extent that governments take into account the preferences of the 
members of society, they should discount the future costs and benefits associated to 
public projects. This preference for near term gratification may be related to 
psychological factors such as impatience or mere myopia
7, to the fact that individuals do 
not have an infinity life span which in turn implies that rational individuals will prefer $1 
today than $1 in the future because there is always a non-zero probability of not being 
able to enjoy the future income, or to risk considerations (beyond project specific risk) 
associated to the possibility that the future cost or benefit will not occur because of a 
natural (or man made) catastrophe. 
 
True, one could argue that for intergenerational projects, the use of pure time preferences 
is perhaps not that much justified, especially if governments have also responsibility for 
future generations even if they have not been born yet.
8 In that case, there would be good 
reasons for policy makers to be more patient than private citizens although the extent of 
the patience to be shown has been the basis for a debate on the issue that goes back to the 
19
th century. At the one extreme of debate we can find a number of authors such as Jevon 
(1871), Rae (1905), Ramsey (1928), Pigou (1932), Harrod (1948) or Price (1989) (just to 
mention a few) who have criticized pure time discounting as irrational and/or unethical 
and argued for a pure time preference rate of zero. At the other end of the spectrum it also 
possible to find authors such as Fisher (1930), Koopmans (1960), Eckstein (1961), 
Henderson (1965), Hirshleifer (1970), Parfit (1971), or  Arrow (1995) who have noted 
that there is nothing irrational with positive time discounting and in fact argued for it on 
both technical and logical/philosophical grounds.  
 
For example, Koopmans (1967) noted that without a positive time discount factor the 
integral of the utility of consumption over an infinite future will not converge for most of 
the paths to be compared.
9 Also on the economics front, Koopmans (1960) argues that a 
                                                 
6 For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001) analyze the US military drawdown of the early 1990s, when 
more than 65,000 military personnel were offered the choice of an annuity or a lump-sum payment with 
break even discount rates exceeding 18 percent. They found that the vast majority of personnel opted for 
the lump sum. This would imply personal discount rates of at least 18 percent (at a time when interest rates 
on government bonds were about 7 percent) and lend support to the idea of a preference for immediate 
gratification. Similarly, Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) calculate that the average 
personal discount rate of 21 empirical studies (all with horizons of more than one year) on the topic is 
around 25 percent. 
7 As early as 1834, John Rae already pointed out that one of the factors that limited accumulation was the 
prospect of immediate consumption and the discomfort associated to delaying instant gratification. 
8 After all, if we were able to ask future generations they may have a different view of the problem.  
9 In his 1928 paper, Ramsey solved this problem by assuming the existence of a finite "bliss" or maximum 
conceivable state of satisfaction that can be achieved by consumers.  However, Chakravarty (1962) agued 
that unless there is a finite level of consumption corresponding to this “bliss”,  the usual qualitative 
restrictions on utility and production functions are not enough to ensure that a solution to the problem 
exists. 
  4zero time discount factor would result in an unrealistically high savings/investment rate. 
On the philosophical front, Parfit (1971) observed that individuals change over their 
lifetimes and hence in principle one cannot assume that there is an enduring entity over 
time to which ascribe future utility. This in turn implies that to some extent we would 
give our descendent future selves the status of other people and hence what matters to an 
individual in the future should logically be less important than what happens today. As 
such, it would not be irrational to care less about the future.  
 
A second argument to discount future costs and benefits associated to projects goes 
beyond pure time preferences. If one assumes that (i) the marginal utility of consumption 
declines with the level of income/consumption (a standard assumption in economic 
analysis); and (ii) future generations will benefit from increasing levels of 
income/consumption (i.e. we are in an economy experiencing growth), then it would not 
be efficient to adopt an egalitarian approach that trades one unit of consumption today for 
one unit of consumption in the future. To the extent that future generations are richer then 
one would expect them to contribute more to their welfare. But clearly, the discount rate 
in this case will depend on the social planner priors regarding future growth, and on the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.  
 
The previous discussion on the social discount rate (r) is elegantly formalized in what is 
known as Ramsey formula. Under a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
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where C is per capita consumption,
10 the Ramsey formula can be expressed as follows: 
 
σ ε β         r × + = .          ( 2 )  
 
In (2) β is a pure time discount rate and σ is the growth rate of per capita consumption.
11  
 
III Calibration of the STP components 
 
III.1 The pure time preference 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the debate regarding the appropriate value of the 
pure time preference is long-standing in the economics literature, perhaps motivated 
because choosing a value for β requires inferring how much today’s society cares for, in 
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10 Note that from (1) -ε is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. 
11 In discrete time the Ramsey formula follows from the fact that along the optimal path small reallocations 
in consumption between time t and t+1 must leave welfare unaltered. As Ramsey (1928) agued this can be 
formally expressed as  . Taking derivatives in (1); substituting; and 
applying logs, (2) follows immediately. 
 
  5Parfit (1971) terminology, future societies. Thus it should not be surprising that empirical 
studies on the issue rely on very different values for β. 
 
On the low side of the spectrum we have the time preference rate used in the Stern 
Review: .1 percent. The Stern review argues for this near zero rate of time preference on 
ethical grounds, as it would imply intergenerational neutrality. However, it is worth 
mentioning that with this choice, the savings/investment rate tends to 1/ε.
12 As we 
discuss below, typical values of ε are in the 1-2 range, something that in turn would 
imply saving rates of between 50 and 100 percent. In other words, a near zero time 
preference rate would imply that current generations should dramatically reduce their 
levels of consumption, in some plausible cases, to subsistence levels. This is, clearly, 
totally unrealistic. 
                                                
 
At the other side of the spectrum Little and Mirrless (1974) put an upper bound for this 
parameter at about 3 percent. However most of the existing applied work relies on values 
of  β that fall in between these extremes -with typical values hovering around 1-1.5 
percent. These values are in most of the cases based on average death rates, a reflection 
of the possibility that individuals’ discount rates are affected by the probability of 
survival from one period to the other (see Pearce and Ulph, 1999 for a discussion of a 
mortality based discount rate), or a combination of mortality rates and pure time 
discounting.   
 
For example, for the UK, Kula (1987) puts β at 1.2 on the basis of the probability of 
death in 1975, whereas Scott (1989) estimates it at about 1.3 percent by merging 
mortality data with a pure time preference rate derived from more than one century of 
data on UK savings behavior. Also for the UK Pearce and Ulph (1999) use an estimate of 
1.1 percent. For countries other than the UK, the typical values are also in this range. 
Kula (2004) in his study of the social rate of return for India uses a value of β at 1.3. 
Similarly, in their study of the social rate of return in six developed countries (Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan, UK and US) Evans and Sezer (2004) use values that range 
between 1 and 1.5 percent on the basis of different catastrophe risk considerations for 
each country.  
 
In this paper, we use a common time preference rate for all the countries in our sample, 
and rely on the lower end of the typical range for the time preference rate (i.e. β=1) as the 
most appropriate value. This choice is the result of correcting downwards the middle 
point of that range. The correction is motivated by the fact that Latin American countries 
have lower mortality rates than developed countries. Table 1 presents crude death rates 
(defined as the number of deaths occurring during the year per 100 population) 
corresponding to the nine Latin American countries under analysis in this paper and to 
nine major developed countries.  The source of the data is World Development Indicators 
2007. Inspection of this table indicates that death rates in the Latin American sample are 
around .6 whereas in the developed countries are around .8.
13 This would imply that on 
 
12 Strictly speaking the expression 1/ε corresponds to the case β=0. 
13 The averages reported by the World Development Indicators for the full sample of Latin American and 
the full sample of high income countries are also .6 and .8 respectively. 
  6average, the time preference rate of the Latin American countries would be .2 percent 
lower than that of the industrial countries. 
 
Table 1. Crude death rates (%) 
Argentina 0.8 Australia 0.6
Bolivia 0.8 Canada 0.7
Brazil 0.7 France 0.9
Chile 0.5 Germany 1.0
Colombia 0.5 Italy 1.0
Honduras 0.6 Japan 0.9
Mexico 0.4 Spain 0.6
Nicaragua 0.5 UK 1.0
Peru 0.6 US 0.8
Average 0.6 Average 0.8
Latin America Developed
 
             Source: WDI (2007) 
 
III.2 Per capita consumption growth rates 
 
The second element that is needed in the calibration of the STP is the expected growth 
rate of per capita consumption.  A standard approach taken in much of the existing 
empirical literature (Pearce and Ulph, 1995; Kula, 2004; Evans and Sezer, 2004; Evans, 
2004) relies on generating the expectations of the future rate on the basis of past per 
capita consumption growth rates. For example, in their studies, Kula (2004), Evans and 
Sezer (2004), and Evans (2004) proxy expected future growth with the average 
consumption growth rate observed over the previous three decades, whereas Pearce and 
Ulph (1995) rely on four decades of data. 
 
While in principle this is a simple and transparent way to operate, in the Latin American 
context can be problematic for two reasons. First, if one views the lost decade of the 
1980s as an outlier not likely to be repeated in the future, averages that include the 1980s 
can be way too low. For example, between 1981 and 1990 Nicaragua experienced a 
decline in per capita consumption of almost 60 percent. In Peru the decline was less 
marked but still above 25 percent. Similarly, during the 1980s consumption per capita fell 
by more than 10 percent in Brazil. It is worth noting that of the countries under analysis 




The first column of Table 2 reports average per capita consumption growth rates for the 
countries under consideration over 1961-2006 whereas in the second column, we 
replicate those averages but now ignoring the growth outcomes of the period 1981-1990. 
Inspection of these two columns shows that the 1980s contributed to lowering long run 
                                                 
14 For Argentina we lack real per capita consumption data from 1980 to 1993. Yet, if we note that per capita 
GDP during the 1980s declined by 25 percent, it seems reasonable to assume that per capita consumption 
did not increase in this country either during the lost decade.   
  7growth in every single country under analysis. On average, the 1980s would have 
detracted more than .7 percent per year from the 46- year average growth rate. In other 
words, if the 1980s are seen not only as part of the past but also as part of the future, then 
estimates based on the first column of table 2 are likely to be appropriate. However, if the 
1980s are just seen as part of the past, then growth estimates based on the second column 
in table 2 may be more appropriate. 
 
Table 2. Per capita consumption growth rate calibration 
1961-2006 1961-2006* FCT FDC FCT1 FDC1
Argentina** 1.4 1.4 1.5 3.9 1.5 2.7
Bolivia 0.6 1.1 1.6 5.5 1.1 3.1
Brazil 2.3 3.2 3.7 4.7 3.0 3.5
Chile 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.3 3.4 3.5
Colombia 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.4 1.7 2.1
Honduras 1.0 1.5 0.9 3.2 1.0 2.1
Mexico 1.8 2.4 3.1 3.7 2.4 2.7
Nicaragua -0.1 2.1 2.8 5.4 1.4 2.6
Peru 1.1 2.2 2.2 3.0 1.7 2.1
Average 1.4 2.1 2.4 4.1 1.9 2.8
Projections Mix Averages
 
* Excludes the 1980s to compute the average growth rate. 
** Data from 1980-1993 are missing. 
FCT. Projections of growth under a continuous trend of reform scenario. 
FDC. Projections of growth under a dramatic change reform scenario. 
FCT1. Projections of growth resulting from merging FCT1 and average growth over 1961-2006.  
FDC. Projections of growth resulting from merging FDC and average growth over 1961-2006.  
Sources: Own calculation using data from WDI and Loayza et al. (2005). 
 
A second reason of why past growth rates in per capita consumption are a poor proxy for 
expected growth rates in the Latin American context is because of the potential role 
played by the reforms implement by the region in 1990s. Comparing the situation in the 
early 2000s and early 1990s, Latin American countries have better macroeconomic 
frameworks, are more open to trade, have more developed financial sectors, and in 
virtually all countries public spending in education has increased. All these elements are 
usually considered in the growth literature as growth enhancers. Moreover, per capita 
consumption growth in the region over the past three years has been at a four decade 
high. Figure 1 indicates that whereas the per capita consumption growth rates were on a 
declining path between the early 1960s and the mid 1980s, since then they have been 
trending up.  Thus, is it possible that as a result of the implemented reforms the region’s 
growth prospects
15 have improved?   
                                                 
15 Strictly speaking when talking about growth prospects we are referring to GDP growth prospects. 
Moreover, most of the analytical studies looking at the evolution of growth focus on GDP growth, 
something that in principle could pose a problem in this context. However, it is worth noting that, at least in 
the countries under analysis in this paper, per capita consumption and per capita growth rates are extremely 
similar. Beyond the fact the average consumption and GDP growth rates over 1960-2006 are the same,  the 
regression line in the scatter plot of annual per capita consumption growth rates against per capita GDP 
growth rates has a slope of .92 (s.e. .06). In this regard, below we base our per capita consumption growth 
projections on per capita GDP growth projections. 








































































  * Each point corresponds to the median growth rate of the nine Latin American countries 
under analysis. The series has been smoothed with a three year backward moving average. 
           Source: Own calculations using WDI data. 
 
The question of whether growth prospects have improved for the region is addressed by 
Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderon (2005) who consider two different future policy 
scenarios. One (denoted FCT in table 2) assumes that the reforms started in the early 
1990s continue over the 2000s at the same pace as that observed in the 1990s. The second 
scenario (denoted FDC in table 2) assumes a dramatic acceleration in the observed pace 
of reform in the region, especially for those countries lagging with their reform agendas. 
Inspection of the growth rates under these two scenarios reveals that in principle there are 
some reasons to expect an acceleration of growth in the region. Under the FCT scenario 
the average per capita growth rate would accelerate to 2.4 percent. Under the FDC 
scenario, reflecting the more ambitious reform agenda implicit in the scenario, the growth 
rates would accelerate to 4.1 percent.
16 
 
Clearly, one could also argue that these projections are too optimistic.
 There are two 
types of arguments that can be given in this regard. First, the estimated accelerations in 
per capita growth are very significant (especially under the FDC scenario): these 
countries only achieved an average growth rate of 2.4 percent in the early 1960s and early 
1970s. The second reason is that, as argued in World Bank (2005), the cross country 
econometric models on which these projections are based, tend to overestimate the 
positive impact of reforms on growth prospects. As for the performance of the region in 
recent years, it is likely to have been the result not only of the reforms implemented 
during the 1990s but also of a good external environment (i.e. high growth in the world) 
and of high commodity prices.  That is, virtue may have played a role in the growth 
outcomes observed in Latin America in recent years, but there seems to be also a luck 
component.  
 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) A1 scenario relies on an 
annual per capita growth rate for Latin America and Africa (both regions are grouped for scenarios 
purposes) of 4 percent from 1990 to 2050. 
  9Thus against this background, we also generate a third set of projections that now merge 
the potential positive impact of the reforms, with the historical growth rates observed in 
the region (i.e. the average over 1961-2006). These projections can be found in table 2 
under the headings FCT1 and FDC1. Note that by construction they fall in between those 
in the previous scenarios. 
 
On the whole, table 2 contains six growth scenarios with per capita growth rates for the 
group as a whole ranging from 1.4 percent (historical average) to 4.1 percent (dramatic 
reform projections) and averaging 2.5 percent.  Below we will experiment with the two 
extreme cases as well as the two mix cases (i.e. FCT1 and FDC1).  
 
III.3 The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
 
The third ingredient needed to calibrate the STP from equation (2) is the elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption. Stern (1977) offers a good review of approaches to 
estimate this parameter and gives a plausible range for ε of between 1 and 10. However, 
this range is narrowed by Pearce and Ulph (1995) who explore the implications of 
different values of this parameter for egalitarian judgments and note that values above 5 
seem totally implausible; and further narrowed by Scott (1989) who gives a plausible 
range of 1 to 2 on the basis of UK long run saving data. More recently, Evans and Sezer 
(2004) estimate it at between 1.3 and 1.7 in six developed countries whereas Evans 
(2005) finds an average value of ε of 1.4 in 20 OECD countries. Beyond developed 
countries, Kula (2004) estimates ε for India and finds a value of 1.64. 
 
In this paper we follow Evans and Sezer (2004) and Evans (2005) who in turn follow 
Stern (1977) and assume that the personal income tax structure reflects the principle of 
equal absolute sacrifice, or 
 
κ = − − )) ( ( U(Y) Y T Y U        ( 3 )  
 
for any value of Y. In (3), T(Y) is the personal income tax corresponding to the income 

















= ε .         ( 4 )  
 
Thus, equation (4) indicates that it is possible to estimate the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of income on the basis of two elements: (i) the effective marginal tax rate; and (ii) 
the average tax rate.  
 
In practice, however, one has to face two difficulties. One is that de jure statutory tax 
rates may be quite different from de facto paid tax rates. This is likely to be the case in 
countries where tax evasion is a serious issue, particularly if individuals with different 
  10income levels have different chances to evade. In this regard, to the extent that those at 
the higher end of the income distribution evade more than those at the lower end (i.e. the 
system is in practice less progressive than intended), estimates of ε based on official tax 
schedules will be upward biased. We tackle this issue by relying on de facto tax rates.  
 
A second difficulty is that in principle the value of the marginal income tax is likely to 
change with the income level, and hence (4) is sensitive to where it is computed along the 
income distribution. To address this concern we proceed to compute (4) on the basis of 
the effective marginal tax rate along the income distribution, and for consistency on the 
basis of the effective average tax rate also along the income distribution. More 




















































ε ,    (5) 
 
 
where N is the number of tax data points used in the calculation. From an empirical point 
of view, for each country we rely on four point estimates corresponding to the 20, 40, 60 
and 80 percent of the income distribution. These point estimates are computed from 
income tax data



















   i=1,2,3,4     (6) 
 
where Ti and Yi are the average taxes and average per capita income level of the i-th 



















.   i=1,2,3,4     (7) 
 
With these elements in mind table 3 reports the estimates of ε. On the whole, the results 
of this exercise are quite satisfactory. Inspection of this table indicates that the estimates 
of ε range from 1.11 in Honduras to 1.89 in Peru with an average value of 1.49. Thus the 
values that we obtain are in line with those commonly reported in the literature, although 
in comparison with the values in Evans and Sezer (2004) and Evans (2005) for a sample 
of developed countries (about 1.4), our estimates of the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income are slightly higher (about .1 on average). This in principle will contribute to a 
higher social discount rate in Latin America than in the developed countries. 
 
 
                                                 
17 I would like to thank Breceda et al. (2006) for providing me with their tax data. 
  11Table 3. Calibration of ε 
Countries t T/y ln(1-t) ln(1-T/y) ε
Argentina 0.0216 0.0161 -0.0218 -0.0162 1.3
Bolivia 0.0015 0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0010 1.5
Brazil 0.0144 0.0080 -0.0145 -0.0081 1.8
Chile 0.0056 0.0042 -0.0056 -0.0042 1.3
Colombia 0.0379 0.0212 -0.0386 -0.0214 1.8
Honduras 0.0269 0.0243 -0.0273 -0.0246 1.1
Mexico 0.0357 0.0287 -0.0364 -0.0291 1.3
Nicaragua 0.0251 0.0185 -0.0254 -0.0186 1.4
Peru 0.0229 0.0122 -0.0232 -0.0123 1.9
Average 0.0213 0.0149 -0.0216 -0.0151 1.5  
              Source: Own calculations 
 
True, it would be possible to argue that one could alternatively compute ε at different 
points of the income distribution and then proceed to average these values.  That is, 


































ε ε ε     (8) 
 
This is explored in table 4 where we report values of εi  (for i=1,2,3,4), together with the 
sample average of these estimates. The last column of the table contains the average of 
these values for each country, whereas the last row contains the cross country average of 
each of the εi  and thus offers information regarding the constancy of ε along the income 
distribution.  
 
Two main elements emerge from table 4. First, on average the values of ε obtained using 
(5) and (8) are very similar: 1.5 and 1.6 respectively. This is despite some significant 
differences at the country level. For example, whereas for Brazil ε is estimated at 1.8 in 
table 3, table 4 reports a value of 2.7.
18 Similarly, in Colombia table 3 indicates a value of 
1.8 and table 4 of 2.1. Second, the cross country average values of εi appear quite stable 
especially for values of i>1
19 when they range between 1.5 and 1.7. Thus this exercise 
would somewhat reinforce the findings in table 3. 
 
IV. Calibration of the STP rate 
 
Section III has discussed the range of plausible values behind the ingredients of the STP 
for Latin America. Thus with these elements in mind we are now in the position to 
compute the STP. This is done in table 5 using the values of ε estimated in table 3.  
                                                 
18 Admittedly, this could be due to the fact that in Brazil we are using only 2 data points for the 
caulculation. 
19 For i=1 ε tends to be lower in all country cases.  
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Countries ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε
Argentine 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.2
Bolivia 1.3 0.7 1.8 1.6 1.4
Brazil 1/ 3.5 1.8 2.7
Chile 1/ 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.6
Colombia 1.2 3.2 2.5 1.5 2.1
Honduras 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Mexico 0.6 1.5 0.5 1.7 1.1
Nicaragua 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
Peru 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8
Average 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.6  
1/In the cases of Brazil and Chile there are consecutive quintiles that report no income tax 
and thus both expressions (6) and (7) are 0.         
 Source: Own calculations 
  
 
The first noteworthy point from this table is the dramatic impact of the different growth 
scenarios. Judging from averages for the group, we find that under the most pessimistic 
growth scenario the social discount rate would be around 3 percent. Similarly, under the 
FTC1 scenario (reform under a continue trend scenario mixed with the past track record 
for the region), the discount rate would be close to 4 percent.  On the other hand, under 
the dramatic reform scenario we estimate discount rates of about 7 percent and in the 
cases of Bolivia and Brazil above 9 percent. Finally, under the FDC1 scenario we obtain 
an average discount rate of 5 percent.  
 
Table 5. Calibration of r 
β ε Average FDC FTC1 FDC1
Argentine 1 1.3 2.9 6.2 3.0 4.6
Bolivia 1 1.5 1.9 9.4 2.7 5.7
Brazil 1 1.8 5.1 9.5 6.4 7.3
Chile 1 1.3 4.6 6.7 5.5 5.7
Colombia 1 1.8 4.2 5.3 4.1 4.7
Honduras 1 1.1 2.1 4.5 2.1 3.3
Mexico 1 1.3 3.3 5.6 4.0 4.4
Nicaragua 1 1.4 0.9 8.4 2.9 4.6
Peru 1 1.9 3.1 6.7 4.1 4.9




              Source: Own calculations 
 
Thus if the recent track record in terms of growth in the region is an indicative of future 
performance, our estimates of the social discount rate would be in the 3-4 percent range. 
However, to the extent that the region improves on its past performance, which taking 
into account how dismal it has been in principle should not be that difficult, the social 
  13discount rate to be used in the evaluation of future projects would increase and estimates 
in the 5-7 percent would be more appropriate.  
 
Clearly, the discussion in the previous paragraph raises the issue of which is the most 
appropriate discount rate to use when there is uncertainty about potential growth 
outcomes. In principle, given a probability density function for the growth rates, one may 
be tempted to compute the expected value of this growth rate and proceed to plug it in 
(2). It should be noted however that for cost-benefit analysis what it matters is the 
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 The discount rates in the figure are computed under the assumption that a social planner 
attaches a probability of .5 to a per capita growth rate of 1.5 percent per year, and also .5 
to a growth rate of 3.33 percent per year. The effective discount rate at time 0 is the E(r). 
The simulation assumes  β=1 and ε=1.5. 
 
For example, assume that a social planner believes that there are equal chances of long 
run growth being 1.5 and 3.33 percent per year and that β=1 and ε=1.5 (so that the 
discount rates turn 3.5 and 6 percent respectively). The average discount rate is in this 
case 4.63 (horizon 0 in figure 2). However, as figure 2 shows the effective discount rate 
resulting from the average discount factor declines as the horizon increases. Moreover, as 
noted by Weitzman (2007) it asymptotically tends to the discount rate associated to the 
lowest growth rate.
20 Put in other words, when there is uncertainty regarding growth rates 
(the rule more than the exception in practice) as the horizon under consideration expands, 
we find that the lower interest rate dominates. Thus in this example uncertainty in future 
                                                 
20  It is enough to note that the effective discount rate (r













1  and 
that this expression tends to min (rj) as n tends to infinity.  
  14growth rates puts the effective discount rate somewhat in between the discount rate 
corresponding to the minimum growth rate and the average discount rate. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
Cost benefit analyses based on high discount rates will have a tendency to favor projects 
with short-run benefits over those with payoffs in the long run. As the discount rate falls, 
we will find more and more projects with benefits emerging in the long run. Thus public 
investment programs can be dramatically different -both in terms of overall envelope and 
nature of projects- depending on the specific discount rate used in practice.  
  
In this paper we have estimated social discount rates for nine Latin American countries 
and highlighted that depending on the growth expectations of the social planner, these 
discount rates can vary dramatically from about 3-4 percent in a future low growth 
scenario to 5-7 percent in a high but still reasonable growth scenario.  We have also noted 
that if these two scenarios are considered by the social planner as having the same 
chances in practice, the appropriate discount rate in these countries should depend on the 
horizon of the project: around 4.4 percent for 25 year horizons, 4.2 percent for 50 year 
horizons and 3.9 percent for 100 years horizon. 
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